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I.
I.

DISCUSSION

CLAIMANT DID NOT RECEIVE A FAIR HEARING
BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

Respondent argues " [t]his Court has previously defined a
fair hearing in the context of the unemployment compensation
program."

Resp't's Br. at 9.

In support of its argument,

Respondent cites to Nelson v. Department of Employment Security,
801 P.2d 158, 163 (Utah App. 1990), for the general rule that
11

' [w] hile [this Court has] recognized the importance and

necessity of preserving fundamental requirements in
administrative hearings, administrative hearings need not possess
the formality of judicial proceedings.'"

Resp't's Br. at 9-10

(quoting Nelson, 801 P.2d at 163) (bracket inserted).

For

additional support, Respondent again cites to Nelson to show this
Court found Nelson received a fair hearing because even though
she appeared pro se, she had ample opportunity to present her
story and cross-examine adverse witnesses.

Id. at 10 (citing

Nelson, 801 P.2d at 163). Respondent further cites to Nelson to
show this Court found a fair hearing resulted because, "'The ALJ,
in fact, questioned the employer's witnesses in order to bring
out Ms. Nelson's side of the story.

Ms. Nelson expressed no

confusion, nor did she request assistance at the hearing.'"
(quoting Nelson, 801 P.2d at 163).

2

Id.

The instant matter is distinguishable from Nelson.

What is

deemed a "fair hearing" in one hearing does not necessarily apply
in the next instance, unless the facts and the procedures are
similar.

Here, the facts and procedures are dissimilar.

This is

because Nelson did not deal with the request for and the denial
of the statutorily mandated issuance of subpoenas, when requested
by a party, at the outset of the hearing process

Accordingly,

Nelson is dissimilar to the instant matter and, as such, does not
support Respondent's argument.
Respondent also argues that "administrative hearings need
not possess the formality of judicial proceedings."
P.2d at 163.

Claimant does not dispute this.

Nelson, 801

However, Claimant

does dispute what Respondent cites as the major theme of the
passage it cites from Nelson, see Resp't's Rpy. at 9-10.
Claimant is not asserting he was involved in a judicial
proceeding.

Such an assertion is immaterial to this matter.

The

relevant theme from Respondent's cited passage is "the importance
and necessity of preserving [the] fundamental requirements of
procedural fairness in administrative hearings[.]"

Nelson, 801

P.2d at 163 (bracket inserted).
One such fundamental procedural requirement for the
preservation of administrative hearings is the issuance of
subpoenas when requested by a party.
3

If fact, by statute, it is

a procedure which is required, not discretional.

See Utah Code

Ann. § 63-46-7(2) (1987) ("S]ubpeonas and other orders to secure
the attendance of witnesses or the production of evidence in
formal adjudicative proceedings shall be issued by the presiding
officer when requested by any party[.]").
If the Legislature did not feel that in order to preserve
the "procedural fairness" of administrative hearings by the
mandatory issuance of subpoenas, then the Legislature would not
have placed the mandatory requirement of the issuance of
subpoenas, when requested by a party, upon the ALJ.

The

Legislature would have left it to his or her arbitrariness or
discretion, or both.

However, this is not the case.

Therefore,

it is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature's mandatory
requirement of the issuance of subpoenas when a party so requests
was put in place to ensure that "procedural fairness" in
administrative hearings will thereby be achieved, which, in turn,
will maintain "the importance of procedural fairness in
administrative hearings."

E.g., Nelson, 801 P.2d at 163.

Procedural fairness loses all significance when a party
requests a subpoena be issued whereby his or her hearing will be
fair, however, said request is denied.

The ultimate arbitrary

denial of such a request will inevitably always prejudice a
party.
4

II. THE ALJ'S FAILURE TO ISSUE SUBPOENAS
IN THIS CASE DID CONSTITUTE REVERSIBLE ERROR
Claimant agrees with Respondent's analysis of Shively v.
Stewart, 421 P.2d 65, 68 (CA. 1967).

Respondent states "[a]

California case involving a similar provision in the California
Administrative Proceedings Act says that because of the phrase of
law 'shall' issue, the issuance is a ministerial act, and the ALJ
has no discretion."

Resp.t's Rpy at 13.

(citing Shively, 421

P.2d at 68).
That case involves the same process which applied to the
Claimant.

Here, Claimant sought the issuance of subpoenas, but

was denied by the ALJ.1
11

Resp't's Reply at 12.

In Shively,

[sjection 11510 of the Government Code provide [d] that on proper

application before the hearing subpoenas 'shall issue,' and
whether the subpoenas are sought for the production of evidence
of to secure prehearing discovery, their issuance is a
ministerial act to which the agency or the hearing officer has no
discretion."

421 P.2d at 68 (brackets inserted).

This is the

same argument Claimant advanced.
Claimant argued that the use of the word "shall" placed a
substantive limitation on an ALJ's discretion with respect to the

x

Both parties agree there was a request made by the Claimant
for the issuance of subpoenas, but his request was declined by
the ALJ.
5

issuance of subpoenas.

Claimant's Opening Br. at 12.

And, based

on this, Claimant's due process rights were violated and,
therefore, this matter should be remanded back to the agency.
Id.

Claimant further argued he had been denied due process when

there has been an abuse of discretion in the manner the ALJ
conducts his proceeding.

See id.

K-Mart Corp. v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona, 679 P.2d 559
(Ariz. App. 1984) 2 also supports Claimant's argument.

In K-

Mart, the Court stated that "this rule permits the administrative
law judge to deny a subpoena request 'only when the requested
statement if not forthcoming or where it is clearly shown in the
statement itself that the solicited testimony would not be
material and necessary."

Id. at 561 (citing Reinprecht v.

Industrial Commission, 550 P.2d 654, 657 (1976)).

The Court thus

concluded that if Reinprecht is applied literally, the
administrative law judge was absolutely required to issue the
subpoenas."

Id.

Similarly, a literal reading of § 63-46-7(2)

leads to the same conclusion, "the administrative law judge was
absolutely required to issue the subpoenas."

K-Mart Corp., 679

P.2d at 657.
Claimant asserts that if an ALJ is left with an arbitrary
choice to issue or not issue subpoenas, then his or her decision
2

Cited and addressed in Resp't's Br. at 13.
6

will have a prejudicial impact on a hearing's outcome.

This is

because an ALJ is left with an arbitrary decision of which
witness(es) any given party should or should not call in order to
assist in the determination of the cause at hand.

However, an

ALJ's role in these administrative hearings is to determine
whether or not there was just cause for the termination of an
individual, not which witness(es) may or not assist in that
determination.

Each party knows who will or will not assist in

that process and, in fact, these decisions are left for each
party to decide, not an ALJ.
An ALJ should proceed with and always maintain a neutral
role in these matters.
objective.

Put another way, he or she must remain

However, when he or she refuses to issue subpoenas at

the outset of any hearing, then the scales of justice are tilted
toward a subjective belief and as a result, prejudices occurs
because it appears as though an ALJ has already decided what he
or she must wait to decide.
Finally, the K-Mart Corp Court also concluded that the
administrative judge found that the administrative law judge
abused his discretion.

A similar finding should be found in the

instant matter.
Respondent's final argument is that "an appellate court may
grant relief only 'if it determines that a person seeking
7

judicial review has been substantially prejudiced."

Resp't's Br.

at 15 (quoting Cache County v. Tax Commission, 296 Adv. Rep. 33,
39 (Utah 1996) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 63-46-16(4))).

"'In

other words, we must be able to demonstrate that the alleged
error was not harmless.

Thus, the aggrieved party must be able

to demonstrate how the agency's action has prejudiced it.'"
Cache County, 296 Adv. Rep. at 39 (citations omitted).
"Substantially prejudiced" quoted in Cache County relied
upon the language stated in § 63-46-16(4).

Respondent misreads

Cache County and what is meant in § 63-46-16(4).

Section 63-46-

16(4), in pertinent part reads: "The appellate court shall grant
relief only if, on the basis of the agency's record, it
determines that a person seeking judicial relief has been
substantially prejudiced by any one of the following."

Id.

These include, but are not limited to: "(d) the agency has
erroneously interpreted or applied the law; (e) the agency has
engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or
has failed to follow prescribed procedure[.]

Id.

With respect to subsection (d), this is what Claimant is
asserting, i.e., the ALJ erred in his interpretation and
application of § 63-46-7(2) when he denied Claimant's request for
the issuance of subpoenas.

8

Regarding subsection (e), similarly, Claimant asserted both,
the ALJ engaged in an unlawful procedures and he failed to follow
prescribed procedure when he denied Claimant's request for
subpoenas.

By failing to issue subpoenas, Claimant "was [denied]

his fundamental right to present witnesses and, [accordingly the
ALJ] frustrated the achievement of substantial justice."

K-Mart

Corp, 679 P.2d at 562 (citation omitted).
III.

CLAIMANT'S RIGHT TO SUBPOENA WITNESSES

Respondent argues that " [i]t appears the claimant contents
the word 'Shall' as used in § 63-46b-7(2) creates a liberty
interest in the right to have subpoenas issued in administrative
hearings."

Resp't's Br. at 17.

Respondent also argues that

"claimant clearly has a due process right to present witnesses on
his behalf, and have those witnesses subpoenaed if necessary."
Id. at 18.

Claimant agrees with Respondent's first statement,

however, disagrees with its second.

Section § 63-46b-7(2) does

not support Respondent's second statement.

Cf. Utah Code Ann. §

63-46-7(2) ("S]ubpeonas and other orders to secure the attendance
of witnesses or the production of evidence in formal adjudicative
proceedings shall be issued by the presiding officer when
requested by any party[.]").

There is no reference to "if

necessary" in this section.

The issuance is mandatory, not

arbitrary.
9

Respondent also argues that " [i]t appears that claimant
contends the word 'shall' as used in UCA § 63-46b-7(2) creates a
liberty interest in the right to have subpoenas issued in
administrative proceedings."

Resp't's Br. at 17.

In addition,

it adds, "Counsel for Respondents could find no case law directly
on point for this question."

Id.

Respondent then offers this

Court's definition of liberty interest."

Id. at 17-18.

Claimant

does not dispute that definition, but would like to supplement
that definition.
"It is apparent from our decision that there exists a
variety of interests which are difficult of definition but are
nevertheless comprehended within the meaning of either "liberty
or property" as meant by the Due Process Clause."
424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976).

Paul v. Davis,

And, " [t]hese interests attain this

constitutional status by virtue of the fact that they have been
initially recognized and protected by state law [footnote
omitted], and we have repeatedly ruled that the procedural
guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment apply whenever the State
seeks to remove or alter that protected status."

Id. at 710-11.

In the instant matter, Claimant's interest in having
subpoenas issued attained Constitutional status because his right
to have subpoenas was initially recognized and protected by State
law, that is, § 63-46b-7(2).
10

Respondent further argues that § 63-46-7(2) must read at the
backdrop of § 63-46b-8(l)(a), "'which provides that the
[p]residing officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to
obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all the
parties reasonable opportunity to present their positions."
Resp't's Br. at 18 (quoting § 63-46b-8(1)(a)).

The two sections

cited for the Respondent are different statutes.

One applies to

what is procedurally correct before a hearing has started.
63-46-7(2).

See §

The second applies to what is expected of an ALJ

once the hearing is underway through the end of the hearing.

See

§ 63-46b-8(l)(a), Respondent has placed the two statutes in the
wrong order.

The numerical order they were placed in Utah Code

Ann, is a good starting point, that is, which statute should be
applied first.
Respondent finally argues that "[i]t is difficult to see how
the claimant was denied a right to have witnesses subpoenaed when
he did not challenge the denial of subpoenas on the record, did
not ask for subpoenas during the hearing, and waived his right by
not objecting the denial of the subpoenas."

Resp't's Br. at 19.

Respondent is attempting to place the burden on the
Claimant.

Section § 63-46-7(2) places the burden on the ALJ.

Claimant asked for and was told, no.

Resp't's Br. at 12.

It is

no different in a civil matter wherein a discovery request is
11

made, and a judge says well, that's okay, you do not need it and
then you proceed with the hearing.

On appeal, one of your appeal

issues would be the denial of your discovery request.

Respondent

admits that such a request was made and that there was a denial
of this request.

Resp't's Br. at 12.

How often does the request

need to be made, and then be told no.

"'In cases where the basic

question is what does the law require? the standard is a
correction of error standard.'"

Tolman v. Salt Lake County

Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting Savage
Indus., Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 811 P.2d 664, 668
(Utah 1991)).
IV.

WHETHER THE IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE ADMITTED
CONSTITUTES AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
OR ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS

Claimant stands on the strength of this Opening Brief.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should remand this
matter back to the agency whereby Claimant can receive a fair and
impartial hearing.
DATED this j W _ day of November, 1996.

"Da^rar" L ". -Grtnast a f f
Attorney for Claimant

12

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF THE PETITIONER was MAILED, postage
prepaid, on this

<& day of November, 1996 to:

Emma R. Thomas
K. Allan Zabel
Attorneys for Respondent
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission
Department of Employment Security
140 East 300 South
P.O. Box 45244
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0244

13

